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The forensic science community has increasingly sought quantitative methods for conveying the weight of evidence. Experts from
many forensic laboratories summarize their findings in terms of a likelihood ratio. Several proponents of this approach have argued that
Bayesian reasoning proves it to be normative. We find this likelihood ratio paradigm to be unsupported by arguments of Bayesian
decision theory, which applies only to personal decision making and not to the transfer of information from an expert to a separate
decision maker. We further argue that decision theory does not exempt the presentation of a likelihood ratio from uncertainty
characterization, which is required to assess the fitness for purpose of any transferred quantity. We propose the concept of a lattice of
assumptions leading to an uncertainty pyramid as a framework for assessing the uncertainty in an evaluation of a likelihood ratio. We
demonstrate the use of these concepts with illustrative examples regarding the refractive index of glass and automated comparison
scores for fingerprints.
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Executive Summary
In response to calls from the broader scientific community [1, 2] and concerns of the general public,
experts in many disciplines of forensic science have increasingly sought to develop and use objective or
quantitative methods to convey the meaning of evidence to others, such as an attorney or members of a jury.
Support is growing, especially in Europe [3, 4], for a recommendation that forensic experts communicate
their findings using a “likelihood ratio” (see Appendix A for an introduction to likelihood ratios).
Proponents of this approach [5-11] appear to believe that it is supported by Bayesian reasoning, a paradigm
often viewed as normative (i.e., the right way; what someone should use) for making decisions when
uncertainty exists [12-14].
Individuals following Bayesian reasoning may establish their personal degrees of belief regarding the
truth of a claim in the form of odds (i.e., ratio of their probability that the claim is true to their probability
that the claim is false) taking into account all information currently available to them. Upon encountering
new evidence, individuals quantify their “weight of evidence” as a personal likelihood ratio. Following
Bayes rule, individuals multiply their previous (or prior) odds by their respective likelihood ratios to obtain
their updated (or posterior) odds reflecting their revised degrees of belief regarding the claim in question.
Because the likelihood ratio is subjective and personal, we find that the proposed framework in which a
forensic expert provides a likelihood ratio for others to use in Bayes equation is unsupported by Bayesian
decision theory, which applies only to personal decision making and not to the transfer of information from
an expert to a separate decision maker, such as a juror.
Nevertheless, a likelihood ratio may be viewed as a potential tool for experts in their communications to
triers of fact. If a likelihood ratio is reported, however, experts should also provide information to enable
triers of fact to assess its fitness for the intended purpose. A primary concern should be the extent to which a
reported likelihood ratio value depends on personal choices made during its assessment. Even career
statisticians cannot objectively identify one model as authoritatively appropriate for translating data into
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probabilities, nor can they state what modeling assumptions one should accept. Rather, they may suggest
criteria for assessing whether a given model is reasonable. We describe a framework that explores the range
of likelihood ratio values attainable by models that satisfy stated criteria for reasonableness. Presenting
several such ranges, each corresponding to different criteria, provides the opportunity to better understand
the relationship between interpretation, data, and assumptions. We propose the concept of a lattice of
assumptions leading to an uncertainty pyramid as a framework for such an analysis.
Recent reports from the U.S. National Research Council and the President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology [1, 2] primarily focus on the scientific validity of expert testimony, requiring
empirically demonstrable error rates. In particular, they promote the value of “black-box” studies [15] in
which practitioners from a particular discipline assess constructed control cases where ground truth is
known (to researchers, but not the participating practitioners) as surrogates for casework in order to evaluate
the collective performance of the discipline. Although we are primarily focused on the use of likelihood
ratios, which these reports only tangentially consider, the concerns identified in this article also apply to
subjectively selecting the pool of control scenarios required to estimate case-specific error rates.
Practitioners adhering to Bayesian principles appear to consider likelihood ratio to be the only logical
approach for expert communication, and they seek to implement its use in all forensic disciplines. We
acknowledge that likelihood ratios provide a potential tool but emphasize that an extensive uncertainty
analysis is critical for assessing when and how likelihood ratios should be used.
In the absence of an uncertainty assessment, likelihood ratios may still be useful as metrics for
differentiating between competing claims when adequate empirical information is available to provide some
meaning to the quantity offered by the expert. Free of normative claims requiring the use of likelihood
ratios, forensic experts may openly consider what communication methods are scientifically valid and most
effective for each forensic discipline.
1. Introduction
In criminal and civil cases alike, the judicial system involves many individuals making decisions after
consideration of some form of evidence (e.g., district attorneys deciding whether or not to file criminal
charges, prosecution or defense attorneys deciding or advising their clients whether to accept a plea
agreement or proceed to trial, jurors voting guilty or not guilty). These decision makers (DMs) often rely on
the findings of forensic experts, whether expressed as a written report or through testimony at a trial, to help
inform their decision. How experts express their findings and how DMs factor that information into their
ultimate decisions remain areas of great public importance and current research; see, for example, [16-17].
Lindley [18] presented a subjective Bayesian perspective for evaluating the weight of evidence1 in
forensic science.2 Within this framework, the odds form of the Bayes rule, namely,
Posterior OddsDM = Prior OddsDM×LRDM (1)
separates the ultimate degree of doubt a DM feels regarding the guilt of a defendant, as expressed via
posterior odds (i.e., probability of guilt after considering the evidence divided by probability of innocence
after considering the evidence), into degree of doubt felt before consideration of the evidence at hand (prior
odds) and the influence or weight of the newly considered evidence expressed as a likelihood ratio3 for the
DM (LRDM).
In theory, the subjective Bayesian framework provides a uniquely rational and coherent4 approach for an
individual to make decisions in the presence of uncertainty. As such, it has garnered much attention among
1The term weight of evidence appears in the book Probability and the Weighing of Evidence by I. J. Good [19], much earlier than
Lindley’s Biometrika paper [18]. In fact, Chapter 6 in this book is entirely devoted to weighing of evidence.
2For a general exposure to the potential role of probability and statistics in the law, the reader may consult Fienberg [20], Dawid [21],
and Kaye and Freedman [22].
3A brief introduction to likelihood ratios is given in Appendix A.
4For a systematic introduction to the statistical meanings of “rational” and “coherent,” see Lindley [13].
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the statistical forensics community, with many scholars advocating that forensic experts summarize their
findings by presenting their own personal LR to DMs5, who could then apply (or envision others applying)
Bayes rule to modify their respective prior odds by the reported LR and arrive at their posterior odds as to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant and choose actions accordingly (e.g., a district attorney decides to file
criminal charges, a juror decides to vote not guilty, etc.). This proposed hybrid adaptation can be expressed
by the equation
Posterior OddsDM = Prior OddsDM×LRExpert. (2)
The proclaimed appeal of this hybrid approach is that an impartial expert examiner could determine and
convey the meaning of the evidence by computing a likelihood ratio (LR), while leaving strictly subjective
initial perspectives regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant to the DM. This adaptation is embraced
by many forensic scientists in several European countries and is currently being evaluated as a candidate
framework for adoption in the United States. Kadane [23], Lindley [13], and others, however, clearly state
that the LR in Bayes formula is the personal LR of the DM due to the inescapable subjectivity required to
assess its value.
Many researchers before us, privately and publicly, have considered whether or not it is appropriate to
associate an uncertainty with an LR value offered as weight of evidence. The reader may refer to a special
issue in Science & Justice [24] that is wholly devoted to this debate. Some of those who adhere to Bayesian
decision theory have asserted that it is nonsensical to try to associate an uncertainty to an LR since its
computation has already taken into account all the evaluator’s uncertainty. Others who acknowledge
sampling variability, measurement errors, variability in choice of assumptions and choice of models have
felt a need to express the effect of such variabilities on an LR value by offering an interval estimate (either a
Frequentist confidence interval or a Bayesian credible interval) or a posterior distribution.
Our paper explicitly identifies the swap from Equation (1) to Equation (2), and any related claims
suggesting that the use of an LR to transfer knowledge from an expert to a DM is somehow normative, as
having no basis in Bayesian decision theory. We further suggest it is necessary to conduct an uncertainty
evaluation regarding the potential difference between LRDM and LRExpert, requiring consideration of the
range of results attainable under a wide-ranging and explicitly defined class of models. This is a broad and
systematic view of uncertainty, for which limited sensitivity analyses or use of weighting tools such as
Bayesian model averaging will generally be inadequate. Instead, we propose using an assumptions lattice
and uncertainty pyramid to enable an audience to evaluate whether an LR characterization is fit-for-purpose.
We begin by outlining the general steps required to theoretically evaluate an LR.
• The DM constructs a collection of scenarios (i.e., possible sequences of acts of those who may have
been involved in the event which is the focus of the legal proceedings or its investigation) to consider.
Constructing an LR requires partitioning this collection of considered scenarios into two sets. Suppose
the DM is a juror who will cast a vote of either ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ at the conclusion of a trial. The
DM may assign any considered scenario to one of two categories, guilty and not guilty according to
how he or she would vote if that scenario were known to be exactly true. Suppose there are a mutually
exclusive scenarios under which the DM would declare the defendant to be guilty. For notational
convenience we refer to this set as Hp = {Hpi}ai=1. Similarly, we refer to the collection of b mutually
exclusive scenarios under which the DM would declare the defendant to be not guilty as
Hd = {Hd j}bj=1.
• After sorting the set of considered scenarios, the DM assigns his or her (prior) degree of belief in each
scenario before considering the totality of trial evidence, E. This is done by assigning a probability to
each scenario such that the sum of all the probabilities is one. Let the probability assigned to scenarios
5E.g., Aitken and Taroni [5] (chapter 3); or the ENFSI guidance document [4], which provides several examples illustrating how forensic
examiners may use subjective probabilities to arrive at an LR value to convey to the DMs the strength of the evidence they examined.
Furthermore, this guidance document also indicates that forensic examiners may convert the numerical LR value into a verbal equivalent
following some scale of conclusions. Verbal expressions, however, cannot be multiplied by prior odds to obtain posterior odds.
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Hpi and Hd j be denoted by pipi and pid j, respectively. Denote the sum ∑ai=1pipi by pi0. Then the sum
∑bj=1pid j equals 1−pi0. Here pi0 is the prior probability from the perspective of the DM that the
defendant is guilty, and 1−pi0 is the corresponding prior probability that the defendant is not guilty.
The conditional probability of scenario Hpi given that the defendant is guilty is
wpi = Pr[Hpi|Hp] = pipipi0 . Similarly, the conditional probability of scenario Hd j given that the
defendant is not guilty is wd j = Pr[Hd j|Hd ] =
pid j
1−pi0 . Note that any scenario not explicitly given a
positive prior weight is given a prior weight of zero.6
• For each scenario with nonzero prior weight, the DM is to assess the probability of the presented
evidence E occurring among all outcomes that could result from the described scenario. Let Lpi
denote the probability of observing the evidence under scenario Hpi. (Some may find it more natural
to denote this quantity as Pr[E|Hpi] but we will use Lpi for succinctness.) Similarly, let Ld j denote the
probability of observing the evidence under scenario Hd j.
• Once a weight and a likelihood have been determined for each scenario of the observed evidence, the
likelihood ratio is given as the sum of the products of the likelihood and the corresponding prior
weight for each scenario in the guilty set divided by the sum of the products of the likelihood and the
corresponding prior weight for each scenario in the not guilty set. This may be expressed algebraically
as follows:
LR =
∑ai=1 Lpiwpi
∑bj=1 Ld jwd j
. (3)
This formulation highlights that computing an LR is generally not free from prior probability
assignment at the level of specific scenarios. The LR is insensitive to the redistribution of prior
weights among scenarios that share a common likelihood within the guilty set (or within the not guilty
set). In the context of source attribution, for instance, the DM may believe the alternative sources are a
random sample from a particular population and not have any additional information that would lead
to assigning different likelihoods among the alternative sources. In this instance the DM might assign
each alternative source a likelihood representing the probability of observing the evidence by random
selection from that population, and the denominator becomes that same probability, regardless of what
weights wd j would be chosen.
As a more concrete and narrowly focused example, suppose that evidence y has been recovered from a
crime scene and that, for simplicity, the DM is only interested in the identity of its source. Further suppose
that, given which potential source actually produced y, there are no further relevant and unknown details
from the perspective of the DM.7 Let S0,S1, . . . ,SN denote the totality of potential sources, one of which is
responsible for y. The actual source of y is denoted by Sq, where q is unknown. The source S0 is of particular
interest to the DM because it is attributed to the defendant. Thus, the primary proposition in question is
H0 : S0 is the source of y (i.e., q = 0).
6A prior weight of zero indicates that the DM would never consider the scenario as plausible regardless of what data were presented. This
hardline stance would seem more likely to be taken unintentionally or as a matter of convenience rather than conviction. (Convenience
occurring from the fact that the entire collection of scenarios with an assigned prior weight of zero can be removed from further
consideration to produce a manageable problem.) Additionally, even the most outlandish scenarios could become seemingly irrefutable,
provided sufficient data. By this notion, it seems unlikely that any prior probability is rigid and exactly zero.
7E.g., if y were a fingerprint, suppose the only relevant component of uncertainty to the DM is which person, or more specifically which
finger, left the impression; or if y consisted of striation marks on a bullet fragment, suppose the DM is only concerned about identifying
the gun from which the bullet was fired. For real situations involving multiple pieces of evidence and multiple experts, some forensic
scientists suggest the use of Bayesian Networks. See, for instance, Taroni, et al. [25].
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The complement of the proposition H0 is Hd = Hc0 , given by
Hd : S1 or S2 or . . . SN is the source of y (i.e., q ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}).
In addition to y, suppose one or more control samples (that is, samples from known sources) are available
from one or more of the sources S j, j = 0, . . . ,N. Denote these, collectively, by x.
Suppose I denotes the totality of information available to the DM prior to being exposed to the
information supplied by y and x. According to the framework Lindley presents, a DM has prior probability
pi0 = Pr[H0|I] for the proposition H0 based on whatever information I is available to him or her disjoint from
y and x. After being informed about the available new information y and x, the DM would like to update his
or her belief concerning H0 in a rational and coherent manner.
The DM is interested in Pr[H0|y,x, I], the probability that S0 is the source of y given all the information
available in the crime scene evidence (y), the control samples (x) and whatever else (I). Using the odds form
of the Bayes rule, and following Lindley [18], Neumann et al. [26] and others, we get
LR =
Pr[y|x,H0, I]
Pr[y|x,Hd , I] . (4)
In the context of this example, there is only one scenario under which S0 is considered the source of y.
Hence, the LR numerator requires only the conditional probability of y given x, H0 and I. Suppose this is
denoted by Pr[y|x,H0].8
When the number of possible alternative sources is greater than one, evaluating the LR denominator,
which corresponds to scenarios under which S0 is not the source of y, is more complex. The proposition Hd
does not say anything about which of S1, . . . ,SN is in fact the source. We can decompose Hd as the union of
the propositions H j, j = 1, . . . ,N, where
H j : S j is the source of y.
Because Hd involves multiple scenarios, computing the LR denominator requires both a weight and
conditional probability of y given x for each H j. Suppose pi0,pi1, . . . ,piN are the prior probabilities, from the
perspective of the DM, associated with the propositions H j, j = 0,1, . . . ,N, respectively. Then the
denominator of the LR takes the form
Pr[y|x,Hd ] =
N
∑
j=1
w jPr[y|x,H j],
where Pr[y|x,H j] is the probability of y given x and H j (and I) and w j = pi j1−pi0 . Thus, w j are the prior
probabilities of the DM associated with H1, . . . ,HN , given H0 is false.
Given the quantities Pr[y|x,H j], j = 0,1, . . . ,N, and pi0,pi1, . . . ,piN , the LR corresponding to H0 is
computed as
LR =
Pr[y|x,H0]
∑Nj=1 w jPr[y|x,H j]
.
List of Concerns
The recommendation that an individual substitute someone else’s LR for his or her own, as represented
in Equation (2), is indefensible, rather than normative, under the subjective Bayesian paradigm.
Nevertheless, if it can be argued that LRExpert is sufficiently close to LRDM , then such a substitution may be
8For simplicity of presentation, we have dropped the term I with the proviso that all probabilities mentioned are conditional on I. Fur-
thermore, it is to be understood that expressions such as Pr[y] (or Pr[y|x]) refer to marginal (or conditional) probabilities or probability
densities depending on whether y is treated as discrete or continuous.
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acceptable to the DM and fit for his or her purpose. However, there are many reasons why an LR value
offered by the expert may differ from that of the DM. The following considerations are intended to highlight
some of the more prominent subjective choices influencing the value of an LR.
1. Whose Scenarios?
According to the definition of the LR, any scenario given a nonzero prior probability by the DM can
influence the value of the LR and is therefore relevant; scenarios given prior probability zero cannot
influence the value of the LR regardless of the value of the corresponding likelihood
Pr[y|x,H j], j = 1, . . . ,N, and are therefore irrelevant to the DM. Even if Pr[y|x,H j] is exactly known for
any scenario proposed, the LR still depends upon the collection of scenarios that are considered as well as
the corresponding weights given to them by the DM, neither of which is known to the expert.
As in the source attribution example above, the set of sources with positive prior probability forms the
relevant population for the DM. If there are several DMs then each one could have their own set of
weights w j and hence their own relevant population. Given a particular relevant population, the weights
assigned to elements of that population can affect the LR unless the assigned likelihoods are constant
across all members of the population. In particular, w j = 1N is a special case, not a mandate. How
sensitive is the LR value to any particular definition of a relevant population?
2. Whose Likelihoods?
In practice, probability functions Pr[y|x,H j] ( j = 0,1, . . . ,N) are rarely known in any authoritative sense.
A forensic analyst will commonly begin with a prior distribution over a class of models that will then be
updated by consideration of empirical data.9 That is, crime scene data y and control data x are assumed to
be conditionally independent, given the parameter θ and the event H j, with known distributions
g(y|θ ,H j) and h(x|θ ,H j) ( j = 0,1, . . . ,N), respectively. Given H j, θ is assumed to have a distribution
described by the probability function f (θ |H j), which is used to express a prior belief about likelihood
functions for x and y given H j (not to be confused with the prior pi j, which reflects prior belief in the
proposition H j). Hence the joint distribution of y, x, and θ , given the proposition H j, is described by the
probability function
a(y,x,θ |H j) = g(y|θ ,H j)h(x|θ ,H j) f (θ |H j). (5)
The quantity Pr[y|x,H j] can be expressed as
Pr[y|x,H j] =
∫
a(y,x,θ |H j)dθ∫ ∫
a(y,x,θ |H j)dθdy
. (6)
Thus, the distribution of interest for source j, Pr[y|x,H j], has been exactly specified through the choice of
f , g and h. Asymptotically, as the number of control observations goes to infinity for each potential
source j = 0,1, . . . ,N, the value of Pr[y|x,H j] may converge to the same answer for many different
choices of f , g and h. In real applications with finite data, however, subjective choices of f , g and h
remain influential.
Support for particular choices of f , g and h is sometimes given by showing them to be consistent (as
defined by some user-selected process for evaluating such things) with empirical data from similar
situations. Even when all DMs agree on what data is appropriate to consider for the case at hand and the
9This framework includes Bayesian model averaging (BMA) (see Hoeting et al., [27]) whereby the DM specifies a collection of proba-
bility model families along with his or her personal probabilities attached to each model. Other DMs implementing BMA may choose
differently leading to different model averaging results. Thus, BMA does not remove the need to examine how assumptions affect
uncertainty if it is to represent or inform interpretations of multiple individuals. Depending on what is considered to be a reasonable
class of priors on the model space, the corresponding range of plausible LR values may tend to be narrower when using BMA than
otherwise.
6
criteria to use in assessing whether or not a model is consistent with that data, multiple choices of f , g,
and h will satisfy that requirement. The question remains, how sensitive is the result to any particular
modeling choice?
3. Approximation
When following a subjective Bayesian approach, one uses a definition of personal probability that could
be viewed as an individual’s assessment of a fair value for a bet of H0 versus its complement. It is
assumed that for any required probability such a value exists and is unique, and that the individual is able
to identify this value without any doubts.10 Moreover, it is assumed that the collection of specified
probabilities satisfy the requirement of coherence (i.e., the standard rules of probability are obeyed).
Lindley et al., [30] discuss the practical issues one must address in order to reconcile the generally
incoherent probability assessments by an individual. They consider several different approaches that one
could use in such a reconciliation process. See also Kadane and Winkler [31]. The fact that such
reconciliation efforts are necessary points to uncertainties associated with subjective probability
assessments. Nevertheless, results derived using such probability models are sometimes treated as free
from uncertainties (see, e.g., Taroni, et al. [32]).
Computing an LR for anything but the simplest of problems will involve approximations. Rather than
assign prior weights that exactly and genuinely reflect one’s personal belief, tractable and familiar
substitutions are made. In the absence of a rigorous uncertainty analysis demonstrating that the resulting
value is sufficiently insensitive to such replacements, the computed value can only provide an
approximation of unknown accuracy for the rational and coherent ratio between posterior and prior odds
of the DM. Although any DM only needs to be personally satisfied regarding the suitability of using any
given LR in Bayes formula, guiding the probabilistic interpretation of others requires greater care.
We note that the considerations listed above are not addressed by explaining the assumptions that
underlie a given statistical interpretation. Stating assumptions promotes transparency, enabling a trained
audience to assess whether a presented analysis seems reasonable - much like a statistical hypothesis test. It
does not, however, even begin to inform the range of results attainable under alternative analyses that may
also be deemed reasonable - the analog of a statistical confidence interval. The transferability of an analyst’s
statistical interpretation (i.e., its value as a surrogate for that of a DM) depends on its robustness11 across the
set of analyses that the DMs would deem plausible.
To assess robustness in a systematic manner, an analyst must first define the space of models to be
considered, possibly by providing an explicit plausibility criterion, so that robustness has a precise meaning.
When extensively characterizing uncertainty, justifying why models in the defined space are reasonable
seems less important than justifying why models not in the defined space are unreasonable. The analyst then
explores the corresponding range of attainable results by fitting multiple models from within the defined
space.12 In instances where this exploration is incomplete, the full range of plausible results, and thus the
suitability of relying on any one particular interpretation, is unknown. To begin to explore the relationship
among data, assumptions and interpretations, we consider multiple assumption sets in a form we refer to as
the lattice of assumptions and present the resulting ranges of LRs as an uncertainty pyramid. This approach
10Some authors have considered the practical difficulties associated with precisely identifying fair values for bets and this has led to the
consideration of imprecise probabilities. For a systematic introduction to this topic see, for instance, Walley [28]. This field remains
an active area of research (Augustin, et al., [29]).
11The book by Morgenthaler & Tukey [33] titled Configural Polysampling: A Route to Practical Robustness provides an interesting
discussion of the need for considering multiple plausible models and emphasizes the development of robust methods of statistical
analysis of data and approaches for assessing small sample robustness of statistical inference procedures.
12When a plausibility criterion pertains to a theoretical probability distribution used to model empirical data, the collection of all plausible
models defines a region in the space of all cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). This region is sometimes referred to as a
Probability Box (p-box, for short). See for instance, Williamson [34], Williamson & Downs [35], Hoffman & Hammonds [36],
Ferson et. al [37], Zhang & Berleant [38-39] Ferson & Siegrist [40], and references contained therein. These and other authors have
investigated methods for propagating uncertainties when component distributions are specified in terms of p-boxes.
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is intended to encourage analysts to explicitly recognize and systematically evaluate the influence of their
subjective modeling choices and is illustrated in the following section.
The Influence of Modeling Assumptions
We are concerned about seemingly innocuous modeling assumptions latently constraining the space of
plausible interpretations as might be presented by a forensic expert. In this section we demonstrate a process
for evaluating the restrictive influence of unsubstantiated information that can creep in solely on the basis of
distributional assumptions made by an analyst. It should be noted that the data and modeling approaches
used in this section are not exhaustive and are not intended to represent analyses generally undertaken by
any particular forensic practice. As such, the actual numerical results obtained in this section are not of
primary interest. Our intention is to illustrate a process for assessing the influence of modeling assumptions
on concrete examples.
Evaluating the influence of a given assumption set (say, assumption set A) requires considering the
results of multiple analyses, one in which assumption set A was made and others in which different
assumption sets (say, assumption sets Bi, i = 1,2, . . .), consistent with empirically observed data, were made.
The influence of assumption set A is reflected by the differences among the conclusions drawn upon
evaluation of each set of results. In cases where the differences are considered to be substantial, assumption
set A has played a critical role, and the conclusion reached from results of the analysis in which assumption
set A was made stretches beyond what the data used in the analysis can in fact support. In such a case, it may
be inappropriate to rely on any particular assumption set.
Illustration 1: Glass Example
We consider an educational example discussed in chapter 10 of Aitken and Taroni [5] involving
measurements of refractive indices (RI) for glass evidence. Suppose a window is believed to have been
broken during the commission of a crime and fragments of glass are recovered from the crime scene.
Suppose also that fragments of glass were found on a suspect.13 Denote by x1, . . . ,xm the RIs of the crime
scene fragments (bulk sample) and by y1, . . . ,yn the RIs of suspect fragments (receptor sample). The two
propositions of interest are
Hp : The receptor sample is from the same source as the bulk sample
Hd : The receptor sample is from a different source than the bulk sample.
Within Source and Between Sources Distributions
Interpreting the information contained in the observed RIs regarding these two propositions requires
understanding the distribution of RIs within each source and how that distribution varies from one source to
the next. (Note that if the RI distribution did not vary across sources, then the RI observations would not
provide any useful information about their source.) Considering how the RI distribution varies from one
glass pane to the next results in a distribution of distributions. The collection of possible descriptions or
models for the distribution of distributions is overwhelmingly vast. The tendency is to limit the class of
potential descriptions by specifying properties of RI distributions that are assumed to remain constant from
one window to the next. In particular, the RI distributions across glass panes are often assumed to be
identical except for their location (e.g., mean or median). That is, the RI distribution for every potential
source is assumed to have exactly the same shape and exactly the same scale (or spread). Such a family of
distributions is referred to as a location family. This assumption implies that the distribution for the
difference between the RIs of each fragment within a glass pane and the median RI of all fragments from
13The fact that fragments of glass were found on defendant’s clothes is in itself of evidential value. But, for our illustration we focus
only on the source question, as with the illustrative example provided in Aitken and Taroni [5].
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that glass pane (i.e., x−median(x)) is exactly the same for any glass pane in the considered relevant
population.
In general, the results of analyses (e.g., LR) can be highly sensitive to deviations from the assumption
that RI distributions differ only by their median from one glass pane to another. Generating empirical
confidence in such a strong assumption would require collecting RI data from many windows with enough
measurements from each window so as to convince oneself that strictly limiting the set of plausible
distributions to a location family will have only a negligible effect on the interpretation of the analysis results
compared to, for instance, when the shape and scale of the presumed location family are allowed to vary
from one source to another. Even with such a vast and consistent dataset, the possibility remains that the RI
distribution of any unexamined window differs substantially from the observed characteristics of the other
windows. Further illustration of the potential influence of assuming a location family on the interpretation of
the observed RI from a particular case is beyond the scope of this paper. That is, the notion of uncertainty
we portray in these examples is incomplete. The uncertainty resulting from a more complete examination is
expected to be greater than what is illustrated here.
For the sake of simplicity, we proceed by supposing that the informed DM is willing to make the
location family assumption. To compute an LR for this scenario, let us first introduce some notation.
Suppose the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of RI values from any single window belongs to the
location family of distributions G(y;θ) = G0(y−θ) for some continuous distribution with CDF G0 whose
median value is zero. Denote the corresponding probability density function (PDF) by g0. Furthermore,
suppose that, across the (relevant) population of windows, the median RIs θ ( j), j = 0,1, . . . ,N, are
independently and identically distributed (iid) with an unknown PDF f (θ) and corresponding CDF F(θ).
That is, we have assumed that f (θ |H j) = f (θ) for all j = 0,1, . . . ,N. For completeness, we display the
expression for the resulting LR in Equation (7).
LR =
∫ (
m
∏
i=1
g0(xi−θ)
) (
n
∏
j=1
g0(y j−θ)
)
dF(θ)
(∫ (
m
∏
i=1
g0(xi−θ)
)
dF(θ)
) (∫ (
n
∏
j=1
g0(y j−θ)
)
dF(θ)
) . (7)
This example provides an illustration of there being no information available for us to justify assigning
different likelihoods to each particular potential source. Hence, we consider the probabilities in the
numerator and the denominator of the LR from the perspective of a population of windows rather than
weighting likelihoods from individual windows according to their prior probability; see related comments
following Equation (3).
Aitken and Taroni Illustrative Analyses
In the illustrative example provided in Aitken and Taroni [5], it is assumed that g0 is the PDF of a
normal distribution with a standard deviation equal to 0.00004. That is, the collection of RIs that could be
observed from windows are iid according to a normal distribution with unknown window-specific mean
θ ( j), j = 1, . . . ,N, and known standard deviation σ equal to 0.00004. Lambert and Evett [41], in their Table
10.5, give average RI measurements from 2269 different samples of float glass. Assuming that these
measurements are representative of the mean RIs associated with sources S j, j = 0,1, . . . ,N, Aitken and
Taroni apply kernel density estimation, using a Gaussian kernel with varying bandwidths, to estimate the
density f (or the CDF F) from these sample data. The resulting estimates are then used to evaluate the LR
corresponding to various hypothetical pairs of average RI measurements from the source (window) and
receptor (suspect) (see Table 10.6, page 341, Aitken and Taroni [5]). Applying the distribution estimates
from Aitken and Taroni to the illustrative example from Evett [42] (see Table 1), and accounting for interval
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censoring of the recorded measurements to plus or minus 0.00001, produced corresponding LRs of 196, 184,
and 72, respectively.
Table 1. Refractive Index Measurements from the window and from the suspect
Measurements from 1.51844 1.51848 1.51844 1.51850 1.51840
the window 1.51848 1.51846 1.51846 1.51844 1.51848
Measurements from the
suspect 1.51848 1.51850 1.51848 1.51844 1.51846
Multiple Plausible Models
The consideration of multiple kernel bandwidths for estimating f begins to illustrate the potential
uncertainty due to the influence of modeling choices. A more complete evaluation may be obtained by
considering how variable the computed LR is across the set of all combinations of g0 and f that might be
considered plausible. The criteria for establishing the plausibility of a prosed model is personal and likely to
vary from one person to the next. However, it is possible for the criteria of a specific individual to be
expressed in an objective manner. When criteria for plausibility have been established, the objective
intention is to characterize the range of results attainable by any model meeting those criteria14 rather than
to identify a single plausible model (or a narrow set of closely related models in the case of multiple kernel
density estimates of f obtained from different bandwidths) and proceeding as though it is the only plausible
model or representative of all plausible models.
Goodness-Of-Fit Tests and Plausibility Criteria
We note that it is common practice for a data analyst to use a statistical test of goodness-of-fit to assess
plausibility of one or more models. In our example, the data modeler could assess the plausibility of a
proposed distribution pair (g0 and f ), given sample data, using any of a number of goodness-of-fit statistical
testing procedures. Some well-known methods are: (1) Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, (2) Cramer-von
Mises test, (3) Anderson-Darling test. For related other approaches the interested reader should also consult
Owen [43], Frey [44], Liu and Tewfik [45] and Goldman and Kaplan [46]. The concept is the same for each
criterion: the data sample itself cannot reduce the space of plausible models to a single CDF .
Here we consider the KS test for illustrative purposes. Any other procedure can be used in place of the
KS test but the computations can be more challenging. The KS test leads to a confidence band for CDFs that
are consistent with the data at a prescribed level of confidence, say 95% (see Figure 2 for an illustration of
the KS confidence band around the empirical CDF for the 2269 RI values reported by Lambert and Evett
[41]). When the KS test is used to assess plausibility, any CDF that lies entirely within the confidence band
would be deemed plausible given the sample data. As the number of observations in the data set increases,
the confidence band narrows and the set of plausible distributions is reduced.
Between-Windows and Within-Window Data Sets for the Glass Example
We now consider the influence of two data sets on plausible choices for g0 and f .
14Analogous to selecting prior distributions when conducting Bayesian inference, the choice of a plausibility criterion should not be
guided by the set of LR values it permits, but upon information available before application to the case at hand.
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Table 2. Refractive index measurements for 2269 glass fragments given in Lambert and Evett (1984).
RI Count RI Count RI Count RI Count
1.5081 1 1.5170 65 1.5197 7 1.5230 1
1.5119 1 1.5171 93 1.5198 1 1.5233 1
1.5124 1 1.5172 142 1.5199 2 1.5234 1
1.5128 1 1.5173 145 1.5201 4 1.5237 1
1.5134 1 1.5174 167 1.5202 2 1.5240 1
1.5143 1 1.5175 173 1.5203 4 1.5241 1
1.5146 1 1.5176 128 1.5204 2 1.5242 1
1.5149 1 1.5177 127 1.5205 3 1.5243 3
1.5151 1 1.5178 111 1.5206 5 1.5244 1
1.5152 1 1.5179 81 1.5207 2 1.5246 2
1.5153 1 1.5180 70 1.5208 3 1.5247 2
1.5154 3 1.5181 55 1.5209 2 1.5249 1
1.5155 5 1.5182 40 1.5211 1 1.5250 1
1.5156 2 1.5183 28 1.5212 1 1.5254 1
1.5157 1 1.5184 18 1.5213 1 1.5259 1
1.5158 7 1.5185 15 1.5215 1 1.5265 1
1.5159 13 1.5186 11 1.5216 3 1.5269 1
1.5160 6 1.5187 19 1.5217 4 1.5272 2
1.5161 6 1.5188 33 1.5218 12 1.5274 1
1.5162 7 1.5189 47 1.5219 21 1.5280 1
1.5163 6 1.5190 51 1.5220 30 1.5287 2
1.5164 8 1.5191 64 1.5221 25 1.5288 1
1.5165 9 1.5192 72 1.5222 28 1.5303 2
1.5166 16 1.5193 56 1.5223 13 1.5312 1
1.5167 15 1.5194 30 1.5224 6 1.5322 1
1.5168 25 1.5195 11 1.5225 3 1.5333 1
1.5169 49 1.5196 3 1.5226 5 1.5343 1
Table 3. Refractive index measurements from 49 different locations from a single window. (Data courtesy of Curran
(2011))
1.519788 1.519901 1.519941 1.519941 1.519941 1.519963 1.519970
1.519974 1.519974 1.519974 1.519974 1.519974 1.519978 1.519978
1.519978 1.519981 1.519981 1.519981 1.519981 1.519985 1.519989
1.519989 1.519992 1.519992 1.519996 1.519996 1.519996 1.519996
1.520000 1.520000 1.520003 1.520007 1.520007 1.520007 1.520007
1.520010 1.520010 1.520014 1.520014 1.520014 1.520014 1.520025
1.520025 1.520029 1.520040 1.520043 1.520047 1.520047 1.520069
Float Glass Data
The first data set (See Lambert and Evett, [41]) contains a collection of average RI measurements
obtained from various within-window samples collected from different manufactured pieces of float glass.
The number of observations contained in each sample is not provided, so sample sizes may vary across the
samples and there is some uncertainty as to how this data should be viewed during evidence evaluation. If
each sample contained a single observation, the KS confidence band might be used to restrict the marginal
distribution of a single RI measurement obtained from a randomly selected window in the population. This
marginal distribution is determined by the choice of g0 and f as h(y) =
∫
g0(y−θ)dF(θ). If the samples
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Figure 1. Histogram of Glass Data
consisted only of means of many replicate observations, the KS bounds could serve to restrict the class of
plausible choices for f , but would not provide much insight for the choice of g0.
For illustrative purposes, we treat the data from this set as providing median RI values for a sample of
2269 windows representative of the relevant population. We use the median rather than the mean to reduce
the sensitivity of the location parameter θ to the tails of the distribution g0, which cannot be well-estimated
from sample data used in this example. The 2269 reported RI values are shown in Table 2. A histogram of
these data is shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the empirical CDF (eCDF) for these data along with the
lower and upper boundaries of a KS 95% confidence band used to define which choices for f will be
considered plausible given the eCDF . In the lattice of assumptions illustration, we consider several
estimates for f based on Gaussian kernel density estimates fit to the 2269 observations with bandwidths
spanning from 0 (which corresponds to the eCDF) to 2.155×10−4, which is the maximum bandwidth for
which the corresponding discrete distribution obtained by accounting for the reported measurements being
interval censored (to plus or minus 1×10−4) remains entirely within the KS confidence band. CDFs for the
discrete distributions obtained by accounting for interval censored measurements and the corresponding
underlying continuous distributions are shown in Figure 2 for both the eCDF and the smoothest kernel
density estimate. Kernel density estimates resulting from the intermediate bandwidths of 10−5, 2×10−5,
5×10−5, and 10−4 are considered during computation but are not displayed. For illustration only, we also
include a CDF not produced by kernel density estimation. This CDF , referred to as Jump, follows the lower
KS bound for values less than the mean RI value m =
∑10i=1 yi+∑
5
j=1 x j
15
for the 15 sample fragments, and
the upper KS bound for values greater than m, with a jump at m. This CDF is shown in blue in Figure 2. An
analyst might feel that the jump distribution is unrealistic and should not be considered. Our point in
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including it is to emphasize that once a plausibility criterion has been laid down, we must attempt to
consider as broad a collection of candidate distributions meeting the criterion as possible; if not, a
plausibility criterion and corresponding uncertainty characterization become moving targets.
Figure 2. 95% Kolmogorov-Smirnov Confidence Band for the Lambert and Evett Glass Data. The bold line segments portray the
discrete distribution obtained by accounting for the reported data being interval censored to ± 0.0001. The faded lines display the CDF
of the underlying continuous distribution.
Bennett Data
The second data set consists of 49 refractive index measurements on samples of fragments from 49
different locations on a single window and is used to evaluate the plausibility of within-window distribution
choices. These data were collected by Bennett et al. [47] and are also mentioned in Curran [48] (see
page 42).15 They are publicly available in the dafs package in R [49]. The original data set consists of RI
measurements for a sample of 10 fragments from each of 49 locations on a single window pane for a total of
490 readings. We have selected a single fragment from each of the 49 locations (the listed value in the first
row of the bennett.df data frame in dafs). These data are reproduced in Table 3 for the convenience of the
15Although not explicitly mentioned in Bennett et al. [47], these data appear to be interval-censored with variable interval
half-widths (approximately) equal to 1.5×10−6. Consequently, all of our analyses based on these data take this interval-
censoring into account.
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reader. For illustrative purposes we treat these 49 RI values as representative of the RI distribution within a
single window, providing guidance for choosing g0.
Figure 3. Top: 95% Kolmogorov-Smirnov confidence band for the CDF of refractive indices from 49 fragments from a single
window (Bennett Data). The empirical CDF is shown in gray. The faded red and green smooth curves respectively
correspond to normal distributions with the smallest and largest scale (standard deviation) parameters such that the
discrete distributions obtained, to account for interval-censoring in the reported data (shown using solid red and solid
green line segments, respectively), are entirely contained within the confidence band.
Bottom: LR values corresponding to various choices of F , reflected by position along the x-axis, and the scale factor
for the shape corresponding to a normal distribution. The left-most results correspond to the estimate of F labeled as
Jump, which is displayed in Figure 2. The remaining positions reflect the bandwidth of the Gaussian kernel leading to
the estimate of F used in computing the LR. Within each choice of F , the LR values are staggered in order of the scale
parameter used to define g0 to emphasize the potential non-monotonic relationship between LR and scale parameter. The
points are color coded to indicate the associated scale parameter values.
For the 49 RI measurements in Table 3, the empirical CDF and corresponding KS 95% confidence band
are shown in Figure 3. In the lattice of assumptions we consider several distributional shapes including those
pertaining to a normal distribution, t-distributions with 1 and 0.5 degrees of freedom, respectively, and χ2
distributions with 2 and 3 degrees of freedom. We also consider a small simulated collection of
nonparametric CDFs (not belonging to any particular parametric family). Some of these nonparametric
CDFs fulfill additional constraints of unimodality and/or symmetry. For each considered distributional
shape, we identify the range of scale parameters such that the discrete distribution obtained by accounting
for the interval-censoring of the reported within-window measurements is contained entirely within the
confidence band. For each shape, we consider estimates of g0 obtained at 15 evenly spaced scale values
spanning this range. For a given shape and scale parameter, the LR is evaluated for each pairing of g0 with
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A1: G0 is a continuous CDF
A2: G0 is a continuous CDF
with unimodal PDF
A3: G0 is a continuous CDF
with symmetric PDF
A4: G0 is a continuous CDF with symmet-
ric, unimodal PDF
A5: G0 is the CDF of a scaled t distribu-
tion with k degrees of freedom, 1 ≤
k ≤ ∞.
A6: G0 is the CDF of a scaled
t distribution with 1 degree
of freedom.
A7: G0 is the CDF of a scaled
t distribution with 0.5 de-
grees of freedom.
A8: G0 is the CDF of a Normal distribu-
tion with known standard deviation σ
Figure 4. Assumptions Lattice for the Glass Example
each of the choices for f described above. Figure 3 provides a visual summary of the analysis when g0 is
assumed to have the shape of a normal distribution. Analogous displays for a subset of other considered
shapes are provided in Appendix B.
Assumptions Lattice
When modeling the distribution of RI values for fragments from any single window, Lindley [18]
assumed normality as do Aitken and Taroni [5]. We recognize this was done for illustrative purposes only.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that normal distributions represent a tiny fraction of CDFs meeting the KS
criteria, and the impact of exclusively assuming a normal distribution is not clear until the set of LR values
obtainable by using other distributions lying within the KS bounds have been investigated. In recognition
that a given individual’s criterion for a distribution to be plausible may include conditions beyond a KS test,
in this section we examine the LR values obtainable by distributions satisfying a variety of assumption sets.
These assumption sets are displayed in the form of a lattice diagram (Gra¨tzer, [50]) as shown in Figure 4. In
the figure, when a line segment connects two assumption statements, the assumption appearing lower on the
lattice diagram is nested within (i.e., more restrictive than) the assumption appearing higher. In Figure 5, we
report interval summaries of the range of LR values over the considered subset of the space of all possible
models satisfying the criteria for a subset of nodes in Figure 4.
Discussion of Results
Results in Figure 5 clearly demonstrate that within this particular educational example the distributional
assumptions made regarding the data generating process can have a substantial effect on the LR values that
would be reported. Keep in mind that we have examined only a small subset of all possible CDFs that
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would be deemed by the KS confidence band to be consistent with the considered RI data. As such, the
uncertainty pyramid portrayed in Figure 5 is likely to under-represent the influence of choices of f and g0
within this example. Once again, the point is that reporting a single LR value after an examination of
available forensic evidence fails to correctly communicate to the DM the information actually contained in
the data. Personal choices strongly permeate every model. If expert testimony is to include the computation
of an LR, we feel an assumptions lattice and corresponding LR uncertainty pyramid provide a more honest
assessment of the information in the evidence itself and better enable an audience to assess the
fitness-for-purpose of the evaluation.16
Figure 5. Ranges of LR values corresponding to subset of choices from the assumptions lattice for G0 combined with Gaussian
kernel density estimates for F .
Illustration 2: Score-based Likelihood Ratio based on Simulated Fingerprints
For this illustration we used a collection of simulated fingerprints to avoid confidentiality issues
associated with using real finger marks from actual casework. To be clear, this example does not reflect or
assess the behavior or performance of trained latent print examiners. Rather, it is intended to examine the
influence of assumptions when forming a score-based likelihood ratio (SLR). The ideas expressed in this
example are not limited to applications of SLRs for friction ridge evaluations, but apply to SLR formulations
for any comparison discipline.
The software system Anguli (see http://dsl.cds.iisc.ac.in/projects/Anguli/index.html; Jadhav,
[51]) was used to generate a pair of exemplar-like impressions for 10,000 simulated fingers. One impression
from each pair was blurred, occluded, distorted and overlaid on a background image to represent a
questioned impression. Minutia were automatically marked in each image using the automatic minutia
detecting program MINDTCT (NBIS, [52]) from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). Figure 6 displays two pairs of simulated images along with the minutia identified by MINDTCT. We
retained all detected minutia with a quality score of at least 20. As seen in the Figure 6, this threshold allows
erroneous minutia detections; stricter thresholds, however, were found to remove true minutia detections. As
the focus here is on the uncertainty in interpreting a given set of scores and not on obtaining the best scores,
no formal optimization was performed to select a minutia quality threshold. The BOZORTH3 algorithm
(NBIS, [52]) was used to automatically assign a similarity score between two lists of marked minutia.
Suppose a questioned impression (Q) from an unknown source is compared to a test impression (Ti)
from source i using algorithm C( , ), resulting in score s =C(Q,Ti). Let F(s) denote the probability of
16The proposal to present an uncertainty pyramid is neither intended to replace, nor intended to lessen, the importance of providing
objective descriptions of empirical results from analysis and investigation.
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Figure 6. Left: Two simulated exemplars used as templates to construct questioned impressions.
Center: Simulated questioned impression. Cyan dots indicate minutia detected by MINDTCT.
Right: Simulated exemplar used for comparison with questioned impressions. Red dots indicate minutia detected
by MINDTCT.
observing score s when comparing two images from a common source, and let G(s) denote the probability
of observing score s when comparing two images from two different sources. Interest lies in the ratio
SLR(s) =
F(s)
G(s)
.
To inform possible choices of F and G, we consider a collection of scores obtained from comparisons
for which we know whether or not the compared images originated from a common finger. We refer to
comparisons between images generated from the same simulated finger (e.g., comparing Questioned 1 to
Exemplar 1 from Figure 6) as “mated.” Comparisons between images originating from different simulated
fingers (e.g., comparing Questioned 1 to Exemplar 2 from Figure 6) are referred to as “nonmated.”
Comparing the questioned and exemplar images within each simulated finger produced a collection of 104
mated scores, SM,i (i = 1, . . . , 104). We compared questioned and exemplar images independently sampled
from their respective collections of 104 images, subject to the constraint that the selected images did not
originate from the same simulated finger, to produce a collection of 105 nonmated scores SNM,i
(i = 1, . . . , 105). The similarity scores output by BOZORTH3 are always nonnegative integers. In our
simulation, mated scores ranged from 0 to 227, and nonmated scores from 0 to 36. Scores of 1 and 2 did not
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occur among any of the mated or nonmated evaluations. The number of occurrences of each integer from 0
to 250 was tabulated for mated and nonmated scores, respectively, and is portrayed in Figure 7. Let
M = [M0, . . . , M250] andNM = [NM0, . . . , NM250] denote the corresponding vectors of occurrences,
where M j = ∑10
4
i=1 I[SM,i= j] and NM j = ∑
105
i=1 I[SNM,i= j]. Here, the term I[S= j] is equal to 1 when S = j and 0
otherwise.
Figure 7. Top: Histogram reflecting proportion of simulations resulting in each score for the mated (red) and nonmated (blue) pairs.
Note that x and y axes are provided on a square root scale.
Bottom: A zoomed-in view, using linear scales. The dotted lines indicate the scores for which the SLR range was examined.
The choice of reference comparisons that are suitable for informing the score distributions F and G for a
particular case is subjective and influential. In this illustration, we ignore this choice as a potential source of
uncertainty and operate as though all DMs have agreed on the simulated collection of scores as being
exclusively appropriate for informing their beliefs. That is, we suppose that all relevant DMs consider the
mated scores to be iid from F (i.e. SM,i ∼ F) and the nonmated scores to be iid from G (i.e. SNM,i ∼ G).
The SLR value corresponding to the score observed for a particular comparison varies as one considers
various plausible sets of assumptions used to evaluate F and G. In this exercise, we examine SLR ranges for
scores of 6, 13, 20, 36, 37, and 38. The scores 6, 13, and 20 were chosen because the corresponding ratio of
relative frequencies were near 0.1, 1, and 10, respectively. The scores 36, 37, and 38 were chosen to
examine the robustness of the SLR at and just beyond the most extreme observed nonmated score (36 in our
illustration).
We consider a different plausibility criterion here than was used in the glass example. Suppose the
proposed mated probability mass function (PMF) is given by F ′ = [F ′0, . . . , F
′
250], where F
′
j = Pr(SM = j).
Similarly, let the proposed nonmated PMF be given byG′ = [G′0, . . . , G
′
250], where G
′
j = Pr(SNM = j). We
consider the test statistic
ZF ′,G′ =
250
∑
i=0
[
(EM,i−Mi)2
EM,i
+
(ENM,i−NMi)2
ENM,i
]
, (8)
where EM,i = F ′i ×104 and ENM,i = G′i×105 are the expected counts associated with a score of i under F ′
andG′, respectively. The tables of observed counts include many cells with small values, so we estimate the
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A1: F and G are multinomial PMFs
A2: F and G are multinomial PMFs arising from kernel distribu-
tion family with free K and free BW
A3: F and G are multinomial PMFs arising
from kernel distribution family with free
K and default BW
A4: F and G are multinomial PMFs aris-
ing from kernel distribution family with
K = 1 and free BW
Figure 8. Assumptions Lattice for the Fingerprint Example
sampling distribution of this test statistic under proposed distributions F ′ andG′ using simulation rather
than relying on an asymptotic chi-squared approximation. That is, in each of many iterations, we draw
M ∗ ∼ multinomial(104, F ′) andNM ∗ ∼ multinomial(105,G′) and use the simulated values to obtain
Z∗F ′,G′ , computed from Equation (8) withM
∗ andNM ∗ in place ofM andNM , respectively. The
collection of Z∗F ′,G′ values is used to asses whether ZF ′,G′ is lower than the 95
th percentile of the test
statistic in Equation (8) under the null distribution where F ′ andG′ are exactly correct. If so, then F ′ and
G′ are considered plausible.
We evaluate the range of SLR values attainable from distributions meeting the criteria described above,
first while considering any F ′ andG′ as candidates and then considering only those belonging to various
classes of Gaussian kernel distribution estimates applied to power transformations of the observed scores.
More precisely, we consider kernel distribution estimates of the form
F ′K1,BW1(s) = 10
−4
227
∑
i=3
Mi×
Φ
(
(s+0.5)K1 − iK1
BW1
)
−Φ
(
(s−0.5)K1 − iK1
BW1
)
1−Φ
(
2.5K1 − iK1
BW1
)
and
G′K2,BW2(s) = 10
−5
36
∑
i=3
NMi×
Φ
(
(s+0.5)K2 − iK2
BW1
)
−Φ
(
(s−0.5)K2 − iK2
BW2
)
1−Φ
(
2.5K2 − iK2
BW2
)
for s≥ 3, where 0 < K1, K2 ≤ 1; BW1, BW2 ≥ 0; and Φ(·) denotes the CDF of a standard normal
distribution. For completeness, define F ′K1,BW1(0) = M0×10−4, F ′K1,BW1(1) = 0, and F ′K1,BW1(2) = 0.
Similarly, defineG′K2,BW2(0) = NM0×10−5,G′K2,BW2(1) = 0, andG′K2,BW2(2) = 0. Note BW1 = 0
corresponds to F ′ being the empirical PMF for the mated scores, and BW2 = 0 corresponds toG′ being the
empirical PMF for the nonmated scores. We also consider the class of distributions where K1 and K2 are
fixed at 1 (still allowing BW1, BW2 ≥ 0), and the class of distributions where BW1 and BW2 are the
bandwidth selections produced by applying the R function density (R Core Team, 2017) with default
settings to the sets
{
Mk1i
}104
i=1
and
{
NMk2i
}105
i=1
, respectively (allowing 0 < K1, K2 ≤ 1). The distributions
produced using k1 = k2 = 1 and default bandwidths did not pass the plausibility criterion as the
corresponding value of ZF ′,G′ was near the 99th percentile of the null distribution. The assumptions lattice
for the considered classes of distributions is shown in Figure 8. Corresponding SLR ranges are presented as
uncertainty pyramids in Figure 9.
19
Figure 9. SLR uncertainty pyramids for various scores. Panels are vertically arranged according to the score for which the SLR is
computed. The right panel excludes results from the general multinomial class in order to better depict the results from the classes of
kernel distribution estimates. Green horizontal lines depict the ratio of relative frequencies, 10× Ms
NMs
. Vertical line segments depict
the range of SLR attainable by distributions satisfying the selected plausibility criterion and belonging to class indicated along the
x-axis. Points shown in bottom two panels corresponding to scores of 37 and 38 indicate the lower bound of the SLR range. The
corresponding upper limits and ratio of relative frequencies are all positive infinity.
Discussion
The viewpoints expressed in this paper are largely motivated by considerations of standard practices in
measurement science, a discipline for which a fundamental purpose is to facilitate meaningful
communication regarding properties of an object or system among interested parties. From the perspective
of metrology, the hybrid LR framework asks a forensic expert to measure the weight of evidence on behalf
of the DM and report its value for subsequent use in Bayes formula. As a measurement, any provided LR
value would require an accompanying uncertainty statement (JCGM, [53]; Possolo, [54]) characterizing the
analyst’s belief regarding its deviation from the “true value,” which the Bayesian paradigm defines as the LR
value a given DM would arrive at following careful review of the complete body of evidence considered by
the expert. Overlooking or dismissing the relevant uncertainty would treat the value obtained by an expert as
though it is a perfect measurement of weight of evidence, universally and exactly accurate. This directly
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contradicts the Bayesian paradigm where no such value can be assumed to exist, as the LR is a personal and
subjective entity.
Although our discussion of the LR has centered around the perspective of Bayesian decision theory, our
concerns apply to any framework motivating the use of an LR as a means for experts to communicate their
findings. Whether a probability is intended to be personal or communal, it is not empirical in the sense that
it is not directly observable. A model is required in order to translate data into a probability, and the question
of how robust the translation is among reasonable model choices remains central.
We do not make a recommendation regarding when an uncertainty characterization yields a particular
LR result as being fit for purpose. Our hope is that policy makers will assess the adequacy of relying on LR
characterizations in the context of the framework presented here, mindful of what range of alternative results
might be reasonably attained and of the criteria used to make that assessment. One might expect to find the
least degree of uncertainty in applications of probabilistic evaluation of high-template, low-contributor DNA
samples, and we recognize that the community may be well-founded in its use of probability to facilitate
knowledge transfer in such cases. We do not view this as an exception to framework we present, but rather
as a scenario in which extensive uncertainty evaluations would likely yield a degree of consensus leading
most people to conclude an offered LR value is fit-for-purpose. Forming a lattice of assumptions and
uncertainty pyramid, including explicitly identifying what data will be considered, for applications in the
field of high-template, low-contributor DNA evaluations could help provide clarity to other forensic
disciplines seeking to demonstrate or develop a basis for using a similar LR framework. In absence of a
suitable uncertainty characterization, or when the uncertainty is deemed too large, LR values may require
less literal interpretations.
When an LR value is the output of a computer algorithm, one may reasonably assume that, given the
inputs, it is highly reproducible. In this sense, an LR value may be transferable as a discriminant score rather
than the ratio of two probabilities. In this context, a discriminant score attempts to produce an optimal
ordering among a collection of independent scenarios that may originate from either Hp or Hd . For a given
ordering, a decision rule is indicated by a threshold, with all scenarios having a score to one side of the
threshold being ascribed to Hd and scenarios with scores on the other ascribed to Hp. The ordering is
optimal when any chosen threshold corresponds to minimizing the error rates given the total number of
scenarios that will be ascribed to Hp and Hd . In a theoretical scenario where the true LR is known for each
scenario, the LR is the optimum discriminant score. When viewed as a discriminant score, an LR value
would not have direct, probabilistic interpretation, as its meaning only becomes apparent from its relative
positioning to LR determinations for other scenarios, evaluated by the same process, including suitable,
controlled reference applications. The effectiveness of a given scoring method can be empirically assessed
using Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots (Peterson and Birdsall, [55]; Green and Swets, [56-57]).
Relying on a given scoring method, an expert could provide demonstrations or scientifically sound
descriptions to answer many helpful questions. For instance, in a source-level evaluation, an expert might
address:
• How are scores produced and why? What collection of reference scenarios are used to evaluate the
performance of the considered scoring methods? How are these chosen in light of the considered case?
• What score was obtained corresponding to the source of interest?
• What alternative sources were considered and what were the corresponding scores?
• How do the scores from this particular case compare to the scores obtained among the reference
collection used to evaluate method performance?
More broadly, objective descriptions of procedures followed and outcomes obtained throughout
investigation of the case and broader experience may present a promising path to ensuring transferability of
information from a forensic expert to DMs.
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Summary
The LR framework has been portrayed by some as having an exclusive, normative role in forensic expert
communication on the basis of arguments centered around mathematical definitions of rationality and
coherence (e.g., Biedermann et al., [58]). These arguments are aimed at ensuring a form of self-consistency
of a single, autonomous decision maker.17 Decision theory, however, does not consider the transfer of
information among multiple parties as occurs throughout the judicial process when one or more DMs rely
on forensic experts to help inform their decisions. Thus, while decision theory may have a normative role in
how a DM processes information presented during a case or trial in accordance with his or her own personal
beliefs and preferences, it does not dictate that a forensic expert should communicate information to be
considered in the form of an LR.18
Bayesian decision theory neither mandates nor proves appropriate the acceptance of a subjective
interpretation of another19, regardless of training, expertise or common practice. It does not recognize one
person’s subjective inputs as superior to those of another, and therefore does not support any one particular
LR value. Validation efforts can demonstrate that the interpretation corresponding to a particular model is
reasonable, but should not be misunderstood to mean the model is accurate or authoritatively appropriate.20
Validation efforts can also inspire an explicit plausibility criterion. By conducting multiple analyses
attempting to span the space of assumptions meeting a specified plausibility criterion, an analyst can
purposefully explore the robustness of an interpretation. Presenting an uncertainty pyramid, along with an
explanation of the corresponding plausibility criterion and a description of the data, may provide the
audience the opportunity for greater understanding of the interactions among data, assumptions and
interpretation. The audience may then, more reasonably, assess whether any particular result is
fit-for-purpose.
If such uncertainty characterizations are considered untenable for a given application, one may be forced
to conclude that the hybrid plan (see Equation (2)), though appealing, is impractical to implement. It does
not mean that, just because one is unable to calculate the required value, one should accept the value that can
be calculated.
We hope this paper will encourage the forensic science community to be mindful of the many subjective
components involved in any interpretation. Correspondingly, we hope best-practice guidances address how
to avoid overstating the authority or rigor underlying any particular interpretation of evidence and require a
presentation of uncertainty. Additionally, we hope the forensic science community comes to view the LR as
one possible, not normative or necessarily optimum, tool for communicating to DMs. We hope such
viewpoints will increase the priority given to developing tools for descriptive presentations that meet the
strict standards of scientific validity by focusing on empirical or reproducible results, assisting the DMs in
directly establishing their own respective interpretations of evidence.
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Appendix A: Likelihood Ratio Introduction
The concept of likelihood ratio (LR) arises naturally when one is faced with the problem of deciding
whether an observation x came from one of two populations. Consider a simple situation involving two urns,
urn 1 and urn 2. Urn 1 has 99 red balls and one green ball, and urn 2 has 99 green balls and one red ball.
One of the urns is chosen (we do not know which one or the process used to make the choice) and, after
thoroughly mixing the balls in it, one ball is selected and its color is noted. Suppose the ball is red. We
would like to know whether the ball is from urn 1 or urn 2.
One may proceed as follows. Let us assume that every ball from the chosen urn had an equal chance of
being chosen. Then, if urn 1 was chosen, the probability of drawing a red ball is 99%. If urn 2 was chosen
then the probability of drawing a red ball is 1%. Thus, a red ball is 99 times more likely to be drawn if urn 1
was chosen than if urn 2 was chosen. That is, the ratio
Probability of drawing a red ball given urn 1 was chosen
Probability of drawing a red ball given urn 2 was chosen
= 99. (A.1)
Whatever the initial belief might have been of an individual regarding where urn 1 or 2 was selected, the
effect of the observing a red ball is likely to encourage the individual to update their beliefs by increasing
the probability they initially assigned to the scenario that urn 1 was selected.
The above example provides the beginnings of the concept of weight of evidence. It also suggests that
the ratio of probabilities of an observed occurrence under each each of the two considered scenarios must
play a role in adjusting one’s prior beliefs regarding which scenario is true. The ratio in equation (A.1) is
called the likelihood ratio for urn 1 corresponding to the observation of a red ball. More generally, if x
denotes data observed from one of two distributions, f1 or f2, then the ratio
Probability of observing x given x came from f1
Probability of observing x given x came from f2
is called the likelihood ratio for f1 corresponding to the observation x. This simple example might help the
reader understand why LR is a quantity of importance when one faces the problem of discriminating
between two populations.
More formal mathematical justifications are available for the use of LR for assessing the added value
provided by new information x when faced with discriminating between two situations. These justifications
are based on ideal applications where the needed probabilities are exactly known. We give a brief outline of
two theoretical justifications often given in the literature.
Discriminating between two simple hypotheses
Perhaps Neyman and Pearson are most recognized as the first to give a formal explanation for the role of
the likelihood ratio in discriminating between two hypotheses, populations, or propositions. Suppose, in
each of many repeated trials Ti resulting in observations xi (i = 1, . . . ,n), one is tasked with deciding from
which of two known distributions ( f1 or f2) the observation xi is drawn. That is, in each trial one must
decide between the hypotheses H1i : xi came from f1 or H2i : xi came from f2. The Neyman-Pearson
fundamental lemma [A1] essentially states that these outcomes are optimally ordered according to the ratio
LRi =
f1(xi)
f2(xi)
,
in the sense that xi should be considered as more strongly favoring H1i than xi′ favors H1i′ if and only if
LRi > LRi′ . Given any ruleR for discriminating between H1i and H2i that is based on an observation xi (i.e.,
conclude H1i if xi satisfies some given condition and conclude H2i otherwise), one can always find an LR
ruleRLR (i.e., for a given τ ≥ 0, conclude H1i if LRi ≥ τ and conclude H2i if LRi < τ) that will, in the long
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run, correctly decide H1i to be true, when it is in fact true, for at least as many trials asR will, and will
wrongly decide H1i to be true, when it is in fact false, in no more trials thanR will.
Note that we have assumed f1 and f2 to be completely known. That is, no modeling was necessary and
no distribution was fitted to empirical data. Neyman-Pearson fundamental lemma is applicable primarily in
such ideal situations. Real situations are more complex and optimality of LR based rules cannot be
guaranteed.
LR in a Bayesian framework.
The Bayesian framework is based on the philosophical viewpoint that all probabilities are personal and
quantify one’s state of uncertainty regarding the truth of propositions. Given the problem of discriminating
between H1 and H2 as above, one first quantifies one’s uncertainties associated with the truth of H1 and of
H2 by (prior) probabilities pi1 and pi2 = 1−pi1. These describe the levels of uncertainty experienced by an
individual prior to seeing the data x. After seeing x, one is interested in the posterior probabilities P(H1|x)
and P(H2|x) (note that P(H1|x)+P(H2|x) = 1) or, equivalently, the posterior odds
Posterior Odds =
P(H1|x)
P(H2|x) =
P(H1|x)
1−P(H1|x) .
An application of Bayes rule for updating one’s prior personal probabilities after having observed new
information leads to the equation
Posterior Odds for H1 =
P(H1|x)
P(H2|x) =
P(x|H1)
P(x|H2) ×
P(H1)
P(H2)
=
f1(x)
f2(x)
× Prior Odds for H1.
If we define weight of evidence associated with x for a particular individual to be the ratio of posterior odds
(given x) of that individual to his or her prior odds (before observing x) then the above equation implies that
LR =
f1(x)
f2(x)
is to be viewed as the weight of the evidence provided by x for H1 for the individual making the
probability assessments.
Surrogate LRs as Discriminant Scores
Neyman-Pearson fundamental lemma tells us that the theoretical LR is the best summary of the
information in x for discriminating between H1 and H2. In this sense, we can say that, when f1 and f2 are
known, LR is the best discriminant score. When f1 and f2 are not known, it is customary to use empirical
information to find surrogates for f1 and f2 (i.e. models) and use these to construct a surrogate LR
corresponding to an observed value x. Different models based on different sets of assumptions will lead to
different LRs. These can all be helpful, some more than others, in discriminating between H1 and H2. We
continue to refer to these surrogate LR values as discriminant scores. The performance characteristics of
competing discriminant scores may be evaluated empirically using suitable, ground-truth known data
through the use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots. For a detailed discussion of ROC plots the
reader is referred to Peterson & Birdsall [A2] and Green & Swets ([A3-A4]).
Summary
The study of LR in theoretical settings provide useful guidance when dealing with problems of
discriminating between two or more populations in real life applications. Since we never really know f1 or
f2, however, we have to rely on available data and statistical models to develop surrogates for the theoretical
LRs and no theoretical optimality properties may be claimed in the Neyman-Pearson setting. Even under the
Bayesian framework there is no unique LR. A main thrust of the paper is to bring to the attention of the
community that these surrogate LRs can have substantial disagreements with one another and no unique
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authoritative model from which to derive an LR for public consumption exists. The usefulness of any
particular surrogate LR (sometimes referred to as an LR system; see Leegwater et al., [A5]) has to be
demonstrated empirically using tools such as ROC plots.
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Appendix B: Additional Results from the Glass Example
In this section of the appendix we display results for additional choices of F and G0. Choices considered
here for G0 are explained below:
Figure 10 χ2 distribution with 3 df
Figure 11 Example symmetric, unimodal, nonparametric distribution
Figure 12 Example unimodal, nonparametric distribution
The top plot in each figure shows the 95% Kolmogorov-Smirnov confidence band for the CDF of
refractive indices from 49 fragments from a single window (Bennett Data). The empirical CDF is shown in
gray. The faded red and green smooth curves, respectively, correspond to members of the chosen scale
family with the smallest and largest scaling factors such that, the discrete distributions obtained by
accounting for interval-censoring in the reported data (shown using solid red and solid green line segments,
respectively), are entirely contained within the confidence band.
The bottom plot in each figure displays the LR values corresponding to various choices for F , reflected
by position along the x-axis, and the scale factor used with the shape chosen for G0. The left-most results
correspond to the estimate of F labeled as Jump, which is displayed in Figure 2. The remaining positions
reflect the bandwidth of the Gaussian kernel leading to the estimate of F used in computing the LR. Within
each choice of F , the LR values are staggered in order of the scale parameter used with G0 to emphasize the
potential non-monotonic relationship between LR and the scale parameter. The points are color-coded to
indicate the associated scale parameter values in accordance with the legend titled σwithin.
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Figure 10. LR values when G0 is a χ2 distribution with 3 degrees of freedom.
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Figure 11. LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric symmetric unimodal distribution shown.
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Figure 12. LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric unimodal distribution shown.
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